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Abstract: Digital piracy is threatening the global multimedia content industry 
and blindly applied coercive Digital Right Management (DRM) policies  
do nothing but legitimise this piracy. This paper presents new software and 
hardware infrastructure aimed at reconciling the content providers’ and 
consumers’ points of view by giving the ability to develop fair business models 
(i.e., that preserve the interest of both parties). The solution is based on the use 
of tamper-resistant devices (smart cards) to securely store sensitive data (e.g., 
personal consumer data or data expressing the terms of a B2C contract or 
licence) and to perform the computation required by a contract/licence 
activation. In other words, smart cards can be seen as tamper-resistant Service 
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constraints of ultra-light devices, such as smart cards and (2) to devise new 
architectures that preserve data confidentiality by combining data encryption 
with security software embedded in secured chips. 
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1 Introduction 
Digital piracy is threatening the global multimedia content industry (there has been a 
16% decline in the music market revenues since 1999 (IFPI, 2003)), while forecast 
institutes agree on the unprecedented potential of the (mobile) audio and video market. 
Existing Digital Right Management (DRM) models fail, however, in solving this paradox 
because they badly adapt to several new attractive usage scenarios and because 
consumers are reluctant to use them for privacy preservation and fairness concerns. 
Indeed, exasperating coercive methods do nothing but legitimise consumers trying to 
access digital assets illegally (Champeau, 2004). This paper presents a new software and 
hardware infrastructure aimed at reconciling the content providers’ and consumers’ 
points of view by giving the ability to develop fair business models (i.e., that preserve the 
interest of both parties). 
The solution proposed in this paper capitalises on the democratisation of powerful 
smart card platforms, which provide an effective element of trust in various client devices 
(e.g., PC, cell phones, consumer electronics). Initially developed by Bull to secure  
the French banking system, smart cards are now used successfully around the world  
in several applications (such as banking, pay-TV, GSM subscriber identification,  
loyalty, healthcare and insurance). Smart cards have actually reached the highest level of  
tamper-resistance (EAL-7 security level of common criteria (CommonCriteria, 2005)) 
and are equipped today with significant computing and storage resources (32-bit CPU, 
mega-bytes of stable storage) (InspireD, 2006). Hence, these platforms are powerful 
enough to securely store sensitive data (e.g., personal consumer data or data expressing 
the terms of a B2C contract) and to perform the computation required by a contract 
activation. In other words, smart cards can be seen as tamper-resistant Service Level 
Agreement (SLA) enablers.  
The proposed infrastructure, named Mobile Digital Quietude (MobiDiQ), is an  
XML-based tamper-resistant right-management engine embedded in a smart card. It 
enforces access control rules (i.e., licences/contracts) depending both on the digital 
content accessed on the device (music, video, photos, games, etc.) and on personal data 
(historical records, user profile, etc.) stored securely on the smart card. Access control 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
rules based on personal data pave the way for new attractive business models (e.g., they 
adapt the fee to the exact behaviour of each user). The MobiDiQ access right engine is 
embedded in the smart card to prevent any tampering from occurring, thereby giving 
strong anti-piracy guarantees to the content provider. Embedding personal data in the 
smart card also brings strong guarantees about the user’s privacy preservation. In 
addition, embedding a versatile and powerful access control manager in a smart card 
gives the opportunity to develop fairer business models. For instance, commercial 
conditions can be negotiated – then enforced by MobiDiQ – between institutions and 
content providers to help some categories of citizens (e.g., students) to access valuable 
contents at a special rate. Parental control rules can also be set up to protect children not 
only against dangerous contents but also against a prohibited use of legal commercial 
contents. Privacy-preserving gifting and lending scenarios can be supported as well by 
MobiDiQ. The expectation is therefore for MobiDiQ to become the mandatory glue 
between every actor’s interest to implement ethical business models. 
From a technical point of view, MobiDiQ provides a unique XML-based framework 
to describe the metadata attached to the protected content, the context of use and the 
user’s profile and to express the access control rules combining them. More precisely,  
the in-card MobiDiQ engine evaluates DRM access control rules expressed in XPath, the 
W3C standard language (W3C, 1999), on standard XML descriptions. The support of 
XML metadata makes MobiDiQ agnostic about the type of multimedia content to be 
protected and the support of XPath access control rules makes MobiDiQ agnostic about 
the DRM model to be used at the application level. The latter point is of utmost 
importance, considering the diversity and absence of interoperability of existing DRM 
languages and models (e.g., XrML, MPEG-REL, ODRL, XACML, XMCL). Roughly 
speaking, the MobiDiQ engine can be seen as a DRM virtual machine with XPath access 
control rules as bytecode. The uniformity of the approach (XML everywhere) greatly 
simplifies the implementation of the MobiDiQ engine, making it compliant with the 
current smart card resources in terms of footprint and performance. A prototype of 
MobiDiQ has been developed on a SIM card platform (cell phone smart card) and has 
been the recipient of the Gold Award of the SIMagine’2005 international software 
contest (more than 300 participating teams) (Bouganim et al., 2005). 
Thus, the contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it introduces a definition of Fair 
Digital Right Management (Fair DRM for short) and illustrates it through practical 
examples. Second, it proposes a tamper-resistant implementation of Fair DRM by 
embedding an XML access right engine in a smart card. 
The rest of this document is organised as follows. Section 2 defines the concept of 
fair use, explains why commercial DRM attempts have failed so far and highlights the 
importance of fairness to make DRM models acceptable to consumers. Section 3 gives a 
global picture of the Fair DRM scenarios MobiDiQ affords. Section 4 introduces the 
concept of the DRM virtual machine and shows how existing DRM languages can be 
implemented on top of it. Section 5 presents technical challenges related to the 
management of XML access rights in a smart card. Section 6 discusses security and 
performance issues and reports on a preliminary experience with MobiDiQ. Finally, 
Section 7 concludes. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
2 Reconciling fair use and DRM 
2.1 The case for Fair DRM 
Codified in the 1976 US Copyright Law and frequently used by scholars, journalists and 
librarians, the fair use provision permits the limited use of copyrighted scientific and 
artistic material to supplement or briefly illustrate oral or written commentary, literary or 
artistic criticism, or teaching materials, without permission from the copyright holder. 
Fair use is necessary to achieve the constitutional purpose of a copyright – to advance 
knowledge and promote learning. In determining that a use is fair, four factors must  
be considered: 
1 the purpose and character of the use (whether it is commercial or non-profit) 
2 the nature of the copyrighted material 
3 the amount of the total work used 
4 the effect of the use upon the potential market (US Department of State, 2006). 
To most Europeans, the term ‘fair use’ refers unambiguously to consumer expectations 
and is not, as in the USA, a legal term of art. In this document, the term ‘fair use’ will be 
used with a broader meaning, namely a set of good practices participating in the 
definition of an efficient, competitive and ethical industry of content distribution. In other 
words, Fair DRM should be the means by which the interest of each party is preserved: 
• User’s point of view: as consumers, users are highly concerned about the 
preservation of the fair use principle as defined in the US Copyright Law. In 
addition, consumers are expecting to pay for the exact content they are interested in 
rather than for complete commercial packages. As citizens, users are also concerned 
about the preservation of privacy (services they use, videos they watch, etc.). To 
illustrate this, a report from IBM-Harris states that the suspicion over the way 
personal data are exploited by providers is the major obstacle to the development of 
new applications on the internet (Westin, 1999). As parents, users are more and more 
concerned about the type of content their children access and the children’s usage of 
these contents (W3C, 2006). Finally, as members of different communities (family, 
friends, colleagues, clubs), users expect a reasonable way to exchange (lending, 
gifting) digital assets. 
• Content providers’ and distributors’ point of view: new generation Peer-to-Peer 
(P2P) technologies accelerate the unrestrained dissemination of content through 
online networks, regardless of ongoing litigation. The impact of worldwide digital 
piracy on the music industry (losses estimated at $5 billion every year by the RIAA) 
and the movie industry (losses estimated at $3 billion every year by the MPAA)  
rose to a dramatic level. According to IFPI (2003), even the sales through the music 
market declined from $38.5B in 1999 to less than $30B in 2003. In 2003, one billion 
movies and 150 billion music titles were exchanged over the internet. In the absence 
of a compelling legitimate offer, piracy is becoming the default setting for IP 
commerce (Tual, 2004). Fair DRM is nothing but another word for ‘compelling 
legitimate offer’. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
2.2 Fair use and DRM, the impossible marriage 
As stated earlier, digital piracy is threatening the global multimedia content industry  
in the short term and the production of any cultural assets (even non-lucrative) in the  
mid term. To face this situation, the major players in the multimedia sector are getting 
organised and put pressure on their respective governments to enact more coercive laws, 
like the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA, 1998) in the USA and the European 
Union Copyright Directive (EUCD, 2001) in the EU. 
However, consumer associations and foundations, both in the USA and the EU, rise 
up against these laws and the related DRM models imposed by major players. According 
to Electronic Frontier Foundation (2004), the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions have 
been used in practice to stifle a wide array of legitimate activities, rather than to stop 
copyright piracy. DMCA is today accused of chilling free expression and scientific 
research, jeopardising fair use, and impeding competition and innovation.  
Some major distributors tried to integrate fair use practices in their online music 
service (DRM Watch Staff, 2004). For example, FnacMusic gives its consumers the 
opportunity to buy either complete albums or single tracks at low charge, raising the bar 
on consumer friendliness by allowing users to burn each downloaded track up to seven 
times and transfer it to other devices up to five times. This recalls the war between 
Microsoft and Adobe over the number of permitted eBook ‘activations’. Music market 
analysts published a critical analysis of the FnacMusic DRM scheme, arguing that it is 
both insecure and too coercive, and thus predicting a promising future to P2P piracy 
(Champeau, 2004). 
2.3 Fair use and DRM, the craved-for marriage 
From the previous discussion, it appears that basic DRM (and simple variants as 
exemplified by FnacMusic, Adobe or DVD region settings) turns against its initial 
objective. As mentioned, exasperating coercive methods do nothing but legitimise 
consumers trying to access multimedia contents illegally (Champeau, 2004). 
A Fair DRM scheme is therefore highly required, with the vital objective of 
reconciling the consumers’, content providers’ and distributors’ interests. A fair DRM 
scheme must be capable of expressing complex business rules and taking into account 
contextual information (e.g., user profile, historical data) as a prerequisite to 
implementing attractive business models while preserving fair use. In the light of  
the discussion held in Section 2.1, a Fair DRM should therefore exhibit the  
following properties: 
• User friendliness 
The consumer should have the opportunity to select the part of a multimedia content 
he/she is interested in (e.g., a chapter, a music track, a video sequence) and to pay 
only for that part. Once the content has been legally acquired, the consumer should 
not be constrained in its daily usage. This means that this content can be made 
available on any device owned by the consumer, without requiring any complex 
manipulation (no ‘uninstall from device#1 to reinstall on device#2’). Moreover, the 
consumer may have the opportunity to freely share legally acquired content with  
 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
      
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
members of the direct family circle. Lending and gifting must also be possible 
among small communities of friends, colleagues, etc. On the other hand, these 
practices must strictly prohibit any illegal mass sharing (e.g., P2P sharing). 
• Fair superdistribution 
Some categories of citizens (e.g., students, needy persons, artists) may have the 
opportunity to access valuable content at a special rate, assuming commercial 
agreements took place between institutions (government, universities, associations) 
and content providers. Again, illegal mass sharing must be strictly prohibited. 
• Ethic enforcement 
The consumer may have the opportunity to control the contents and his/her 
children’s usage of these contents. 
• Privacy 
The privacy attached to all the aforementioned practices must be strictly preserved. 
The objective of MobiDiQ is precisely to enable such Fair DRM, thanks to the secure 
smart card platform. The smart card will serve both as a tamper-resistant and private store 
for contextual information and as a Secure Operating Environment (SOE) to evaluate and 
enforce complex business rules based on these contextual data. 
3 Fair DRM scenarios 
3.1 MobiDiQ infrastructure 
Figure 1 depicts the MobiDiQ infrastructure. Each user has a multimedia cell phone 
including a MobiDiQ-enabled SIM card. SIM cards are used here as a case study  
but similar scenarios can be envisioned on any client devices equipped with a smart card 
or a USB smart token. The SIM card embeds the MobiDiQ access controller and the 
user’s profile (detailed in the next subsections). Basically, the users acquire encrypted 
multimedia content and encrypted licences from content providers. The licences are 
decrypted by the SIM card and checked by the MobiDiQ DRM engine, taking into 
account the metadata describing the multimedia content, the user’s profile and potential 
historical data (all expressed in XML). Depending on the outcome of the licence 
verification, MobiDiQ may allow ‘playing’ (part of) the multimedia content. To this end, 
the decryption key(s) required to decrypt the multimedia content is(are) extracted from 
the metadata. 
The Shared Licence Repository (SLR) is a cornerstone of the MobiDiQ infrastructure. 
It ensures four fundamental properties for the user’s licences, the profile information and 
the historical data: 
1 Availability – the SLR ensures the storage of the aforementioned data and makes 
them accessible from any user’s device (under strict access control policies). 
2 Resiliency – as a regular database system, the SLR guarantees that the 
aforementioned data can be recovered in case of failure. This property is required to 
cope with situations like smart card failure, or loss or theft of the device the smart 
card is embedded in (e.g., cell phone). 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
      
 
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
3 Sharing – the SLR is a central repository by which licences can be exchanged among 
a community of users.  
4 Privacy and integrity – the information stored in the SLR is kept encrypted and 
signed to guarantee its confidentiality and integrity.  
The SLR may be hosted by any server and may be included, for instance, in a telecom 
operator offer as a (charged or free) service. 
Figure 1 MobiDiQ Fair DRM scenarios 
3.2 User friendliness scenarios 
3.2.1 Private licences 
Let us assume that John Doe wants to listen to a given song on his cell phone. A classical 
way to ensure that John can acquire a private licence is to encrypt it with John’s SIM  
card public key (assuming a PKI infrastructure is used). Therefore, the unique way to 
play the song is to decrypt the licence with the corresponding private key, owned and 
protected by John’s SIM card. While this solution is satisfactory for private licences used 
on a single device, it must be extended to enable multi-device usage (e.g., cell phone, 
mp3 player). 
3.2.2 Multi-device usage 
To handle multi-device usage, MobiDiQ allows the creation of a group of devices 
identified by a GroupPrivateKey, and the acquisition of licences encrypted with the 
corresponding GroupPublicKey. The maximum number of devices belonging to the 
group, say NbMaxDevice, must be limited to avoid illegal mass sharing. This point will  
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be discussed further later on. Let us come back to the initial scenario, assuming now that 
John uses a cell phone and a PDA, both containing a MobiDiQ-enabled SIM card. 
Thanks to a simple GUI, John asks his phone SIM card to create the group JohnGroup. 
MobiDiQ then adds two fields to John’s profile: (1) the Group.JohnGroupPrivateKey 
(obtained through a PKI infrastructure) and (2) the Group.JohnGroupCount recording  
the current number of devices in the group. Adding the PDA to John’s group is possible 
if the condition (Group.JohnGroupCount < NbMaxDevice) holds. In that case the 
Group.JohnGroupPrivateKey is transmitted from the phone card to the PDA card (by 
encrypting it with the PDA card public key) and stored in the PDA card. In addition, 
Group.JohnGroupCount is incremented. 
3.2.3 Familial usage 
The group mechanism explained above can be used as well to allow media sharing 
between family members. To prevent illegal mass sharing, it is important to restrict the 
number of groups a device can belong to. There are two conflicting philosophies here. 
Existing DRM models do not integrate the group concept, which is nothing but allowing 
a device to belong to an infinite number of groups. As a side effect, these models 
drastically reduce the number of permitted transfers of a digital content to any device 
(e.g., five with FnacMusic), strongly hurting user friendliness. The MobiDiQ philosophy 
is fairly different. Each device can join a rather reduced number of groups, typically a 
single one corresponding to the direct family circle (parents and their children).1 
Consequently, the NbMaxDevice limit can be set to a much larger value (e.g., 10 to 15) 
to encompass all the family’s devices, and the number of transfers can be unlimited. 
Thus, user friendliness and anti-piracy concerns can be met altogether. 
3.2.4 Licence lending 
Binding a licence to a single group of devices can be considered too coercive by many 
users willing to lend digital content to people outside the direct family circle (e.g., 
grandparents, friends), as is possible today with classical media (e.g., music CD). 
MobiDiQ affords lending in such a way that the lending action can remain free of charge 
(user friendliness) while preventing mass piracy. Let us assume that Lucie wants to lend a 
given licence to her friend Julie for a week. MobiDiQ handles this case in three steps. 
First, a specific record is added to Lucie’s profile (on her SIM card and on the SLR) to 
disable a personal use of that licence for one week.2 Second, the licence is downloaded 
on Lucie’s SIM card, decrypted, updated to include a one-week validity limit,  
re-encrypted using Julie’s public key, and finally uploaded on the SLR. Julie can now 
retrieve her private licence and listen freely to the music for one week. 
3.3 Superdistribution scenarios 
Let us now assume that John is a teacher and, as such, may benefit from fee reductions to 
licences associated with academic contents under an agreement concluded between 
content distributors and the Ministry of Education. John’s profile is enriched with the 
‘Teacher’ tag, authenticated thanks to a cryptographic signature from the Ministry of  
 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Education. In addition, the Ministry of Education delivers to John a specific teacher 
licence that will be required to validate the reduced fee licences purchased by John. This 
second licence includes an additional condition checking that John is actually a teacher 
employed by the Ministry of Education (i.e., checking that the signed ‘Teacher’ tag is 
present in John’s profile).  
The same process may occur with Jim, who is a student at the University of Versailles 
and benefits from preferential access to some contents (negotiated by the University of 
Versailles). The university may enrich Jim’s profile with specific information (student 
status, Master’s degree, education domain, etc.) that is used to personalise the licences 
delivered by the university. 
3.4 Ethic enforcement 
Finally, MobiDiQ affords protection to children against dangerous contents and also 
against a prohibitive use of legal commercial contents. Indeed, parental control rules can 
be defined and can complement regular licences following the same principles as above.  
To enable parental control on Lucie’s cell phone, John (Lucie’s father) enters a 
special PIN code allowing him to define specific fields in Lucie’s profile.3 These fields 
can be, for instance, Lucie’s birth date (to enforce controls on age limit), some threshold 
values for violent or sexual scenes in videos, and more generally any kind of information 
required by John to set up the desired parental control. Then, John selects access control 
rules that can be based on the media metadata (e.g., video scene description), on 
contextual data (hours of the day, localisation)4 and on historical data (e.g., number of 
movies or games played on the cell phone), thus allowing powerful and personalised 
parental control. Parental control looks like a regular licence, the rules of which take 
precedence (i.e., have a higher priority) over any other rules. 
Note that ethic enforcement can also be of interest in the fair superdistribution context 
(e.g., an association or club negotiates preferential access to some resources for all its 
members but has strict obligations with respect to its under-18 members or any other 
category of members). 
4 A DRM virtual machine 
4.1 About the DRM standards 
Several initiatives (e.g., XrML (2006), MPEG-REL (ContentGuard, 2004), ODRL 
(2006), XACML (2006), XMCL (2001)) demonstrate the need for expressive and 
extensible DRM languages capable of implementing a large variety of business models. 
Some of these initiatives are gaining wide acceptance. For example, XrML from 
ContentGuard is used by Microsoft in its DRM implementations. XrML also formed the 
basis for MPEG-REL, the Rights Expression Language of MPEG-21. The Open Digital 
Rights Language (ODRL) has been adopted by the Open Mobile Alliance (2006) for its 
DRM standard. While these DRM languages have not been designed with fairness  
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
      
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
concerns in mind, their expressive power makes them more adapted to express Fair DRM 
scenarios. Unfortunately, this disparate offer plays against DRM models’ interoperability 
and these standards are too complex to be implemented in smart cards. 
4.2 The DRM virtual machine approach 
While different in their syntax and usages, the DRM languages mentioned above share 
strong commonalities. To illustrate this, let us consider XrML as a reference language. 
The constituents of an XrML grant (the central part of an XrML licence) are:  
• the principal to whom the grant is issued 
• the right that the grant specifies 
• the resource that is the direct object of the ‘right’ verb 
• the condition that specifies the terms, conditions and obligations under which the 
right can be exercised. 
Principal, right and resource are respectively named party, right and asset in ODRL and 
subject, action and resource in XACML, with similar meanings. ODRL integrates 
conditions within the right statement while XACML distinguishes between conditions 
and obligations. XACML also supports denials (i.e., negative authorisations) in addition 
to grants. The way a right is actually exercised is implementation dependent and may 
differ depending on the DRM infrastructure, on the application and on the type of content 
to be protected.  
By providing a unique XML-based framework in order to describe the metadata 
attached to the protected content, the context of use and the user’s profile, and to  
express the access control rules combining them, MobiDiQ is a unifying technology. 
Indeed, the MobiDiQ engine evaluates DRM access control rules expressed in the W3C 
standard language XPath (W3C, 1999) on XML descriptions. Thus, the DRM languages 
mentioned above can be easily supported by translating native expressions into XPath, 
and any kind of content described in regular XML can be protected. This fundamental 
feature will be exemplified in the next section. 
Roughly speaking, the MobiDiQ engine can be seen as a DRM virtual machine with 
XPath access control rules as bytecode. To help understand how this DRM virtual 
machine works, we introduce below a brief background on XML and XPath and the 
XML access control implemented by MobiDiQ. 
4.2.1 XML background 
XML, the Extensible Markup Language promoted by the W3C, has become a de facto 
standard for the presentation, exchange and management of information. Figure 2 
presents two samples of XML metadata describing an MPEG-21 video5 and a user profile 
in their textual form. Roughly speaking, an XML document can be seen as a tree of 
elements (e.g., Seq), each one demarcated by an opening and closing tag (e.g., <Seq> and 
</Seq>). Attributes (e.g., value) may be attached to elements. Terminal elements (at the 
leaves of the tree) are represented by text (e.g., Closer). 
 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Figure 2 XML metadata, profile and licences 
 
<Video> 
 <Title> Closer </Title> 
 <Film> 
  <Seq>  
   <Desc°> …… </Desc> 
   <SexRating> 3 </SexRating> 
   <Key> xxxxxxxxxx </Key> 
  </Seq> 
  <Seq>….</Seq> 
 </Film> 
 <Bonus> 
  <Seq>….</Seq> 
  …. 
 </Bonus> 
 <Analysis> 
  <Seq>….</Seq> 
 </Analysis> 
</Video>  
Video XML Metadata 
 
<Profile> 
  <SIM_PrivateKey> xdxdxd </SIM_PrivateKey> 
  <UV_Student> xabc </UV_Student> 
  <UV_Master> shqdq </UV_Master> 
  <Group value = “John”> JohnGrpPrivateKey </Group> 
  …. 
</Profile> 
Profile XML Data 
 
Video Licence:  
 Require University_Versailles License 
 Rule R1: < UV_Member, play, ⊕, /Video/Film> 
 Rule R2: < UV_Member, play, ⊕, /Video/Bonus> 
 Rule R3: < UV_Member, play, ⊕, /Video/Analysis> 
 
University_Versailles Licence 
 Rule R4: < [not /Profile/UVStudent], play, Θ, /Video/Bonus> 
 Rule R5: < [not /Profile/UVMaster], play, Θ, /Video/Analysis> 
 Rule R6: < ALL, play, Θ, //Seq[SexRating > 3]> 
 
Licenses 
4.2.2 XPath background 
Queries can be expressed over an XML document using the XPath language. An XPath 
expression allows one to navigate in the document through the parent axis (denoted by /) 
and the descendant axis (denoted by //) and to apply predicates on elements and 
attributes. The result of an XPath expression is an element (or a group of elements) along 
with its (their) subtree(s). To illustrate the power and simplicity of XPath, let us consider 
the following two expressions: /Video/Film/Seq/Key selects all the decryption keys of  
the sequences of the film, while //Seq[SexRating>3] selects any sequence (anywhere in 
the document) having a direct child SexRating whose value is greater than 3. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
4.2.3 MobiDiQ access control model 
Several authorisation models have been proposed recently for regulating access to XML 
documents. The MobiDiQ access control model is inspired by Bertino et al. (2001), 
Damiani et al. (2002) and Gabillon and Bruno (2001). The MobiDiQ access control 
model keeps the foundation and the expressive power of these models while discarding 
subtleties which could compromise a smart card implementation of the model. 
In our model, access control rules take the form of a quadruple <subject[condition], 
action, sign, resource[condition]>. ‘Subject’ identifies the user(s) the rule applies to. It 
takes the form of an XPath expression allowing the selection of a group of subjects 
satisfying given conditions expressed on their profile. ‘Action’ is self-explanatory. ‘Sign’ 
denotes either a permission (positive rule) or a prohibition (negative rule). ‘Resource’ 
corresponds to elements or subtrees in an XML document, identified by an XPath 
expression. We consider here a rather robust subset of XPath denoted by XP{[],*,//} 
(Miklau and Suciu, 2002). This subset, widely used in practice, consists of node tests, the 
child axis (/), the descendant axis (//), wildcards (*) and predicates or branches […]. For 
example, a rule of the form < /Subject/Profile[age<16], play, θ, /Video//Seq[SexRating  
> 3] states that teenagers are prohibited (negative rule) from playing any video sequences 
having a sex rating higher than 3. 
The cascading propagation of rules is implicit in our model, meaning that a rule 
propagates from an XML element to all its descendants in the XML hierarchy. Owing to 
this propagation mechanism and to the multiplicity of rules for the same user, a conflict 
resolution principle is required. Conflicts are resolved using two policies: 
1 Denial-Takes-Precedence, which states that if two rules of opposite signs apply to 
the same element, then the negative one prevails 
2 Most-Specific-Object-Takes-Precedence, which states that a rule which applies 
directly to an element takes precedence over a propagated rule. 
4.3 Translation of existing DRM languages 
Let us now see how the aforementioned DRM languages can be translated in the 
MobiDiQ bytecode. While MobiDiQ contains advanced features that cannot be expressed 
in existing DRM languages, ensuring a backward compatibility is an important concern. 
We illustrate below the flavour of the translation considering XrML as the target  
DRM language. 
The translation takes place as follows: 
• Principal – while a principal must be resolved to a single party (e.g., represented  
by a private key in a PKI infrastructure) during the interpretation of the right 
expression, it can actually represent a group of persons (e.g., a member of an 
institution). In MobiDiQ, the principal (i.e., subject) is expressed as an XPath 
expression applied to the user’s profile embedded in the smart card. This approach 
has two main advantages. First, it gives a very simple and powerful way to define 
principals (e.g., teenagers, Master’s degree students of University U). Second, the 
smart card guarantees both the privacy of this profile information and its tamper 
resistance (the card holder could try to tamper her profile to get larger rights). 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
• Right – the right is the permitted action on the resource (e.g., play, print, copy, lend). 
In MobiDiQ the right (i.e., action) is executed for each XML element qualified by 
the XPath expression on the resource.  
• Resource – the resource is the digital asset to be protected. In MobiDiQ, the  
resource is once more represented by XPath expressions applied to the XML 
metadata describing the resource. The expressiveness of the XPath language 
associated with the capability to declare multiple positive and negative rules allows 
us to define a resource as a set of digital assets (e.g., all movies of category U) or as 
sub-part(s) of a digital asset (e.g., movie M except the violent scenes) at a very fine 
granularity level. This fine-granularity level participates in the satisfaction of user 
friendliness by giving the ability to define very precisely the part of a multimedia 
content the consumer is ready to pay for. 
• Condition – conditions can range from simple ones (e.g., a time interval) to rather 
complex ones (e.g., based on historical data). In MobiDiQ, every element that 
participates in a condition is integrated in the user’s profile embedded in the smart 
card. Thus, conditions can be expressed in the Subject field again using XPath 
expressions applied to profile data. It is worth noting that the privacy preservation 
and tamper resistance provided by the smart card to these data are of utmost interest. 
4.4 Running example 
Figure 2 shows a sample of the XML metadata attached to a given video, the user’s 
profile and the access control rules expressing the licences downloaded by the user. It 
illustrates the scenario presented in Section 3.3. The video is divided into several tracks 
(film, bonus, analysis), each one subdivided into sequences that include descriptions, 
values indicating the rating in terms of violence, sex content, decryption keys, etc. The 
user’s profile is also stored as an XML file with a very simple structure. 
In this example, MobiDiQ has to deal with two licences. The first one is issued by the 
content provider and states that any member of the University of Versailles may have the 
right to play the Film (R1), Bonus (R2) and Analysis (R3) track of the video. The second 
licence, delivered by the University of Versailles, adds some restriction to the previous 
one, specifying that the Bonus track is restricted to students (R4) while the Analysis track 
is restricted to Master’s degree students (R5). Finally, the last rule expresses that any 
sequence rated with a value higher than three for sex content should not be played. The 
Require statement stipulates that the second licence is mandatory for enabling the first 
one. Note that a required licence always restricts the possibilities for the user (Rules R4, 
R5 and R6 have a negative sign). Indeed, the university cannot grant more rights than 
those delivered by the content provider itself. 
5 Technical challenges 
5.1 Smart card architecture 
Smart card is today the most widespread representative of an SOE. Existing smart cards 
typically embed on a single chip, a 32-bit RISC processor (cadenced at about 50 MHz), 
memory modules composed of ROM (about a hundred KB), static RAM (some KB) and 
electronic stable storage (hundreds of KB of EEPROM or FLASH), and physical security 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
modules. The limited amount of on-chip computing and storage resources is primarily 
owing to security reasons: the smaller the silicon die, the most difficult and costly the 
tampering attacks are. The ROM is used to store the operating system. The RAM is used 
as working memory (heap and stack). Electronic stable storage is used to store persistent 
data and downloaded programs. Figure 3 pictures this typical hardware architecture.  
Figure 3 Typical smart card architecture 
The smart card internal resource balance is very unique. The processing power, calibrated 
to sustain cryptographic computations and enforce security properties, is oversized with 
respect to the other resources. Conversely, only a little amount of RAM remains available 
for the embedded applications, the major part of the RAM being preempted by the 
operating system. Finally, electronic stable memories generally exhibit very good read 
performance (e.g., 60–100 ns/word in EEPROM) but suffers from dramatically slow 
write time (e.g., about 10 ms/per word in EEPROM).  
The challenge is then to design a MobiDiQ engine which can accommodate  
this particular resource balance while providing acceptable performance for the  
targeted applications. 
5.2 MobiDiQ engine 
The core of the MobiDiQ engine is the XPath access right controller embedded in the 
smart card. While several access control models for XML have been proposed recently, 
few papers address the enforcement of these models. Existing solutions rely on a memory 
materialisation of the input XML document to be protected (Bertino et al., 2000; Damiani 
et al., 2002; Gabillon and Bruno, 2001). Roughly speaking, these algorithms work as 
follows. First, a building phase parses the input XML document and builds a DOM 
representation. Second, a tree labelling phase evaluates the access control rules related to 
a given subject and tags any node targeted by the corresponding XPath expression. Third, 
a conflict resolution phase resolves potential conflicts among rules targeting the same 
node and propagates the final decision about the outcome of each node to its subtree. 
Finally, the pruning phase discards every node annotated negatively. 
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Considering the smart card constraints in terms of RAM size and write cost in stable 
memory, building a materialisation of the XML document is precluded. Thus, we 
designed a streaming XML access right controller. To the best of our knowledge, this 
work was the first to consider a streaming management of access control policies 
(Bouganim et al., 2004).  
At first glance, streaming access control resembles the well-known problem of XPath 
processing on streaming documents. There is a large body of work on this latter problem 
in the context of XML filtering (Diao and Franklin, 2003; Green et al., 2003; Chan et al., 
2002). These studies consider a very large number of XPath expressions (typically tens of 
thousands). The primary goal here is to select the subset of queries matching a given 
document (the query result is not a concern) and the focus is on indexing and/or 
combining a large amount of queries. One of the first works addressing the precise 
evaluation of complex XPath expressions over streaming documents is Peng and 
Chawathe (2003), which proposes a solution to deliver parts of a document matching a 
single XPath. While access rules are expressed in XPath, the nature of our problem 
differs significantly from the preceding ones. Indeed, the rule propagation principle along 
with its associated conflict resolution policies (see Section 4.2) makes access rules not 
independent. The interference between rules introduces two new important issues: 
1 At parsing time the evaluator must be capable of determining the set of rules 
targeting a given node and deciding which one applies according to the conflict 
resolution policies. 
2 Some rules may be inhibited by others according to the conflict resolution policies; 
thereby optimisations such as suspending evaluations of rules can be devised. 
Our streaming access right controller works as follows. The controller is fed by an  
event-based parser (SAX, 2004) raising open, value and close events respectively  
for each opening, text and closing tag encountered in the input document. Each XPath 
expression participating in an access control rule definition (either in the subject or 
resource statement) is represented by a non-deterministic finite automaton (Hopcroft  
and Ullman, 1979), named Access Rule Automaton (ARA). An ARA is made up of  
states connected by transitions. Tokens traverse the ARA while transitions are triggered, 
at document parsing time. An ARA has one target final state (representing the element 
targeted by the XPath expression) and may have zero, one or more predicate final  
states (one for each predicate involved in the XPath expression). When all final states of 
an ARA have been reached by a token, the corresponding XPath expression becomes 
active, meaning that it qualifies all forthcoming elements. The outcome of the current 
resource element is actually determined thanks to a conflict resolution algorithm 
managing the priorities among all active rules (i.e., access control rules having active 
XPath expressions). 
As a conclusion, the core of the MobiDiQ engine (i.e., the DRM virtual machine) is 
made up of one XPath evaluator algorithm managing the non-deterministic finite 
automata and one conflict resolution algorithm. These two algorithms are simple and 
compact enough to be embedded in existing smart cards. The details of the algorithms 
can be found in Bouganim et al. (2004). 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
5.3 MobiDiQ architecture 
Figure 4 illustrates the components involved in MobiDiQ, their interactions and their 
location (smart card, untrusted terminal and SLR), depending on the security requirement 
attached to each of them. The user’s profile and the access control engine have to be 
embedded in the smart card to benefit from its tamper-resistance while the remaining part 
of the architecture can run in an untrusted environment. The figure shows a particular 
implementation of MobiDiQ in a smart phone context (i.e., a cell phone equipped with a 
smart card, typically a SIM card). If the location of the components depends on the 
targeted platform (for tamper-resistance concerns), the architecture applies the same way 
to any smart card-enabled device. The figure is self-explanatory considering the technical 
details given in the preceding sections. 
Figure 4 MobiDiQ architecture 
From the application developer’s point of view, all of the complexity of the internal 
storage, access control evaluation and security management is confined to the smart card 
and smart card proxy codes, so that the application developer can concentrate on the 
application logic. 
6 Security and performance issues 
6.1 MobiDiQ security 
The security issue is twofold. From the content provider and content distributor point of 
view, security means enforcing the tamper-resistance of licence management. This refers 
to the licence itself and the data linked to the licence, namely the resource and the 
contextual information (user’s profile and historical data) with which conditions can be 
defined. From the consumer point of view, security means enforcing the privacy of one’s 
data (profile, historical data). The smart card serves both as a tamper-resistant and private 
store for contextual information and as an SOE to evaluate and enforce complex business 
rules based on these contextual data. The information stored outside the smart card  
(i.e., licences, profile information and historical data stored in the SLR) are kept 
encrypted and signed to enforce their privacy and integrity. It is worth noting that all 
communications are encrypted and that a PKI infrastructure is assumed. 
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The security level provided by MobiDiQ is bounded by the security level provided  
by the smart card itself. While smart cards cannot be considered unbreakable devices, 
they satisfy the highest certification level (EAL 7) of the Common Criteria (2005), the 
international standard (ISO/IEC 15408) for computer security. One may also question the 
generality of the MobiDiQ approach, considering that any rendering device is assumed to 
be equipped with a smart card. Smart cards and other forms of secure chips are today 
plugged or embedded into a growing variety of devices (e.g., PC, PDA, cellular phone, 
set-top-box) to serve different applications (certification, authentication, electronic 
voting, e-payment, healthcare, anti-piracy certification techniques, etc.). Thus, SOEs have 
become a reality on client devices (TCPA, 2006). 
6.2 Performance issues and experiments 
When dealing with large digital content (e.g., video, music), the traditional 
performance/security trade-off must be addressed. For maximum security, the whole 
digital content should traverse the smart card and be decrypted on the fly. This requires a 
high-bandwidth smart card equipped with a powerful CPU. While some advanced smart 
card platforms support a full-speed USB throughput, most existing smart cards actually 
exhibit a much lower communication throughput.  
A prototype of MobiDiQ has been developed on such a low throughput SIM card and 
has been the recipient of the Gold Award of the SIMagine’2005 international software 
contest (Bouganim et al., 2005). This prototype dealt with a selective dissemination of 
multimedia streams through unsecured channels. We considered videos encoded using 
the MPEG7 standard, which allowed the storing of short descriptions of the scenes in the 
XML metadata. Video objects being quite large and the response time being an important 
requirement, the smart card used in this experiment was unable to solve the equation 
owing to its limited communication throughput. To tackle this issue, we traded security 
for performance as follows. We separated the metadata from the video stream and 
encrypted the video stream thanks to secret keys stored in that metadata. In this setting, 
the smart card performs the access control on the XML metadata and delivers the 
decryption keys to the media player, according to the user’s privileges, in the spirit of 
existing Conditional Access methods (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5 MobiDiQ on low-bandwidth smart cards 
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7 Security and performance issues 
Digital piracy is threatening the global multimedia content industry while existing  
DRM models badly adapt to several new, attractive usage scenarios and exasperate 
consumers owing to too coercive methods. MobiDiQ aims at reconciling the content 
providers’ and consumers’ points of view by giving the ability to develop fair business 
models (user friendliness, fair superdistribution, ethic enforcement, privacy preservation). 
In this respect, MobiDiQ can be considered a tamper-resistant enabler of ethical Service 
Level Agreements. 
From a technical point of view, MobiDiQ is an XML-based tamper-resistant  
right-management engine. The support of XML metadata makes MobiDiQ agnostic about 
the type of multimedia content to be protected, while the support of XPath access control 
rules makes MobiDiQ agnostic about the DRM model to be used at the application level. 
Roughly speaking, the MobiDiQ engine can be seen as a DRM virtual machine with 
XPath access control rules as bytecode. 
A prototype of MobiDiQ has been developed on a SIM card and has been the 
recipient of the Gold Award of the SIMagine’2005 international software contest. The 
demonstration of this prototype showed how licences are expressed, exchanged and 
evaluated in a MobiDiQ-enabled cell phone when playing a video sequence under strict 
parental control (violent scenes are withdrawn from the video stream). 
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Notes 
1 Models allowing more than one group could be envisioned to handle specific situations. 
2 Lucie cannot erase this record from the SLR thanks to cryptographic integrity checking and 
she cannot remove it from her SIM profile thanks to the tamper-resistance feature of the card. 
3 Parental control fields are signed using the parental control private key to ensure their 
authenticity. 
4 For example, to prevent the child from watching videos during classes or in the school area. 
5 The metadata have been simplified for space considerations. 
